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Evaluating Mergers in Food Industries
Under Procedures for Litigation or Regulation
Malcolm B. Coate1
Introduction
In the 1990’s, antitrust enforcement tends to follow a dual track analysis, one for litigation and the
other for settlement.  The litigation track is based on the case law and applies to mergers likely to go to
court, while the settlement track is based on the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Merger Guidelines and applies to mergers in which institutional realities transform either the DOJ
or the FTC into a regulatory agency (Coate 1996).   Based on FTC data (Coate et al. 1995), proposed 2
mergers that involve relatively small competitive overlaps, small absolute transactions or unusually large
companies tend to face regulatory enforcement, while a clean acquisition of a direct horizontal competitor
by a mid-sized rival likely faces rules based on the litigated case law.  While most cases follow the
regulatory route, the litigated cases may obtain the lion’s share of the publicity.
Court Decisions
To understand how the courts apply the antitrust laws, it is necessary to review enforcement actions.
Table 8.1 highlights relevant information on six litigated cases in the food industry.  They all share
narrow markets, relatively high Herfindahls, and generally focus on branded products, but differ with
respect to the findings on ease of entry and buyer power.  Four cases (Coke, Coke SW, Bigelow, and
Tasty Baking) involved some type of injunction, while two cases (Country Lake Foods and Kraft) were
dismissed.  Moreover, two cases (Bigelow and Tasty Baking) involved preliminary injunctions with
relatively narrow markets that may not have been upheld in a full trial on the merits.
These cases all involved oligopolistic industries, with one reaching the level of a dominant firm.  All
but one (Kraft) involved the acquisition of a significant rival and even in the Kraft case both firms were
large in a niche product line.  Abstracting from the questions of market definition and entry, these cases
generally offer strong structural foundations.  Moreover, efficiency considerations are rarely mentioned
in the decisions.  Thus, an evaluation of a proposed merger in an oligopolistic food business would tend
to focus on issues of market definition, entry, and maybe efficiencies.
Case law on market definition is confused at best.  Some cases with relatively narrow markets exist
(see Bigelow and Tasty Baking discussed above), although in other cases, broad markets are accepted
after the respondents produced evidence suggesting some type of switching among the products occurred
(see Calmar and Donnelley cases).  While econometric studies may be particularly insightful on market
definition grounds, it is possible or even probable that both parties to the litigation will present models
that generate conflicting results.  Courts would likely have great difficulty in resolving the technical112
TABLE 8.1  Selected Merger Decisions in the Food Industry
Case Market (Change) Brand Barrier Power
Herfindahl Strong Entry Buyer
FTC v. Coca Cola Carbonated Soft
Company Drinks 2651 (344) Yes Yes No
Bigelow v. Unilever Herbal Tea 7228 (3328) Yes No No
FTC v. Coke Branded Carbonated
SouthWest Soft Drinks 3421 (614) Yes Yes No
Tasty Baking v.
Ralston  Snack Cakes and Pies 4077 (1685) Yes Yes No
DOJ v. CountryLake
Foods Fluid Milk 2832 (646) No No Yes
New York v. Kraft Ready to Eat Cereal 2281 (66) Yes Yes Yes
Source:  Coate (1992) and the author’s review of court decisions.  The Coke Southwest decision was
reversed and returned to the FTC for further review.  Coca-Cola Bottling Company of the Southwest v.
FTC, 5  Circuit Court of Appeals, June 10, 1996, No. 94-41224. th
disputes associated with the parameter estimation.  In contrast, documentary and testimonial evidence
is likely to have more impact on the outcome of a market definition dispute than econometric evidence,
because it is easier for the court to understand.
The case law approach to entry is better defined.  With Waste Management and later Baker Hughes,
courts have found entry arguments offsetting the competitive concerns caused by concentration.  In Baker
Hughes, Judge, now Supreme Court Justice Thomas explicitly rejected the DOJ’s proposed “quick and
effective” standard, noting that even the threat of entry can maintain competitive performance.  Thus,
the law is clear that actual entrants need not be identified.  For example, if one could list a few firms with
a chance to enter, the combined probability of at least one entrant is likely to meet the court test.  In
effect, the court seems to be demanding evidence on some type of entry barrier before concluding entry
is not likely to offset an anticompetitive price increase.3
Efficiency considerations probably require a precedent-setting decision before they rise to the level
of entry in immunizing a merger.  While efficiencies are cited favorably in some court decisions, the level
of quantification falls short of what might be expected in a full efficiency defense.   It is unlikely a food 4
industry merger will serve as an efficiency test case.
FTC Enforcement Decisions
While the Merger Guidelines purport to define enforcement policy, it is also useful to review the
limited information on enforcement priorities.  Table 8.2 lists the products involved in three Hart-Scott-
Rodino (HSR)-reportable food industry mergers (Coke, KKR, and McCormick) challenged by the FTC113
TABLE 8.2  Selected FTC Enforcement Actions in the Food Industry
Products in HSR Cases Pre-merger Market Structure        Entry Possibilities
Carbonated Soda Duopoly and Fringe Limited (Brand Name)
Ketchup Oligopoly Possible (Shelf Space)
Packaged Nuts Oligopoly Possible (Shelf Space)
Shelf Stable Chinese Foods Duopoly and Fringe Possible (Shelf Space)
Spices Dominant Firm Limited (Shelf Space)
Sources:  F.T.C. v. Coca-Cola Company, D. 9207;  F.T.C. v. Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts, C. 3253;
F.T.C. v. McCormick, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CHH) ¶ 67,976; and publicly available information.
in the mid-to-late 1980’s.  The Coke case resulted in both a federal court and FTC decision against the
merger, the KKR investigation ended in a settlement and divestiture of three product lines, and the
McCormick/Spice Island merger was abandoned after an investigation including a federal court decision
enforcing the second request.  A few other food industry mergers were allowed to proceed after internal
investigations.
In these matters, the food products of concern (Coke—carbonated soda; KKR—ketchup, packaged
nuts, and shelf-stable Chinese foods; and McCormick—spices) were branded and faced limited competi-
tion.  The spice case involved a dominant firm, while the soda and Chinese food case affected markets
best described as duopolies, and the remaining markets could be described as concentrated oligopolies.
In the soda and spice cases, the target could be best described as a fringe firm, while the others involved
branded rivals.  Thus, it is fair to say that all the matters involved strong structural cases on the merits,
abstracting from questions of market definition and entry.  Efficiency issues are more difficult to explore
without compromising the confidential nature of the case files.  Overall, a regulatory analysis of a food
merger is likely to be strongly influenced by the outcome of a Guidelines evaluation of market definition,
entry, and efficiencies.
In general, it is relatively easy to confuse Guidelines issues and generate inappropriate policy recom-
mendations.  A naive Guidelines analysis could support an aggressive enforcement program with markets
limited to niche products and entry considered blocked by the need to brand products and acquire shelf
space.  On the other hand, one could argue for broad markets based on the assumption that foods are all
substitutes and conclude that entry is always easy based on a count of the number of new food products
introduced each year.  This would generally preclude antitrust enforcement in the food industry.
A sophisticated Guidelines analysis would attempt to define realistic markets in which a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably impose a significant and nontransitory price increase.  In some markets, a
five percent price test may be appropriate.  However, it seems reasonable to validate the five percent
price test by determining if enough consumers would switch from the product of the acquiring (or
acquired) party to defeat a unilateral pre-merger price increase.  If not, the use of the five-percent test
will artificially guarantee a narrow market.
In grocery retailing, interbrand competition may involve relatively large promotions (either in-store
specials or coupons) instead of small reductions in list price.   Thus, instead of focusing on list price 5
changes to define markets, one might look at the effects of promotions on sales.  If a firm regularly114
promoted its brand-name product and gained sales from generics or low quality brands, a broader market
must be seriously considered.  This approach would have the added advantage of focusing the analysis
on the responses of the marginal customers.  A class of products dependant on promotions or coupons
to move output is unlikely to survive a realistic hypothetical monopolist test and hence a broader market
would be required.
In some cases, maybe branded cola, even a broad market would be concentrated, while in others the
addition of a generic product or a close substitute might eliminate the competitive concern.  Any
statistical analysis of a grocery market should address the promotion issue either directly through the
price data or indirectly through a study of coupons.  It is likely that a statistical analysis would prove
useful in the regulatory procedure.  Of course, it is doubtful that the regulators will accept black box
methods for predicting economic effects, instead they will insist on complete disclosure and replicability
of the relevant results.
The Guidelines entry analysis focuses on timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry (Coate and
Langenfeld 1993).  In general, the timeliness standard of two years can be easily met and the sufficiency
concerns are likely to be limited to assuring the entry under study addresses the competitive effect of
concern.   Thus, the analysis concentrates on the more theoretical question of likelihood of entry.  It is 6
important to note that the analysis does not involve a survey of the hypothetical entry decisions, instead
it requires an analytical study of the entry incentives created by a noncompetitive price increase.
Two general approaches to the likelihood of entry merit attention.  First, it is possible that noncom-
petitive behavior will attract “premium store brands” as entrants.  In effect, these products leverage the
retailer’s reputation for quality into new niches and almost automatically obtain the recognition of a
branded high-quality product without a new investment in sunk costs.  This retailer branding may be
more efficient than manufacturer branding, because the retailer can use the quasi-rents from its entire
portfolio of premium products to assure the quality of each product.  (For a discussion of quality
assurance, see Klein and Leffler (1981).)  In practice, industry experts should be able to differentiate
between grocery items that can be easily co-packed as private label and those that cannot.  Examples of
easily co-packed products probably could include nuts and shelf stable Chinese foods, while co-packing
a high quality product is likely to be difficult for colas, ready-to-eat breakfast cereals, and soft cookies
produced through patented technologies.  Overall, some food product markets are unlikely to be monop-
olized given the growing trend to retailer branding.  However, food markets which exhibit production
processes protected by patents or trade-secrets are likely to remain difficult to enter without an invest-
ment in new facilities and brand name capital.7
Second, it is possible for a firm to enter most food products with a new branded product.  This entry
analysis is more complicated, because the entrant likely faces some sunk costs to branding (hence scale
is important) and is unlikely to choose a “me-too” product.  The scale concern appears manageable.
First, sunk costs associated with entry need to be identified to ensure that they are significant.   Next, 8
data on sales generated by recent successful entrants in similar markets must be collected.  These sales
would be compared to the market universe associated with the product under study.  The Guidelines
hypothesize a five percent share as sufficient to infer likely entry in response to a noncompetitive price
increase and note other figures can be considered.  For example, if the market was growing, it would be
reasonable to conclude that a new product could profitably obtain an output level greater than five
percent of the current market in response to a noncompetitive price increase.  Alternatively, if the level
of sales required for a successful entry mandates a very large share, the Guidelines suggest entry is not
likely.
At least two generalizations of the basic Guideline likelihood analysis should be considered to adjust
for the differentiated nature of likely entry into food markets.  First, the addition of a new product offers
consumers more choice in food consumption and such choice should be worth slightly higher prices.
Thus, one could assume entry would be profitable even if market share did not rise to the level
anticipated in the Guidelines.  Second, most entrants in the food industry are likely to be able to exploit115
economies of scope with their other food products.  Thus, they could have lower costs than the incum-
bents or obtain some benefit from their investment in sunk costs for their other food product lines.
Again, another adjustment could be made in the Guidelines analysis.  While both of these changes are
likely to be small, it does seem entry should be presumed likely in marginal cases.
Efficiency analysis is also possible under the Guidelines (Stockum 1993).  While the basic approach
to measuring efficiencies is relatively well understood (focusing on real cost savings unavailable through
alternative reorganizations), less time has been spent on balancing competitive and efficiency concerns.
One approach would attempt to show efficiencies are relatively certain, while adverse effects are
speculative.  (For a qualitative analysis of this point, see Pitofsky (1992).)  Thus, the scenario in which
price falls could be compared to one in which it rises, with the balancing determined by the magnitudes
and expected probabilities of the two scenarios. Alternatively, an efficiency analysis could focus on the
dynamics of the marketplace with short-run anticompetitive effects compared to long-run price declines
due to efficiencies.  A third approach would integrate efficiencies into the competitive analysis with
efficiencies that lead to structural changes that lower price being considered procompetitive.
Conclusion
Competitive analysis in the food industry should focus on the key issues of market definition and
entry under either a litigation or regulation framework.  While the analytical techniques are likely to
differ, the conclusions on market definition and entry go a long way to determining the outcome of the
competitive investigation.  Although issues associated with how competition occurs in the market are
important (for one approach to evaluating competitive effects, see Werden and Froeb (1994)), these
questions are secondary to market definition (and thus concentration) and entry.  Of course, a complete
analysis would identify how the underlying competitive structure of the market is adversely affected by
the merger, before blocking a transaction with the analysis simultaneously considering issues of market
definition, concentration, competitive effects, and entry.  Efficiency considerations, while interesting,
await a change in case law and/or policy before becoming fully relevant.
Notes
Malcolm B. Coate is a Deputy Assistant Director for Antitrust in the Bureau of Economics, Federal 1
Trade Commission.  The analysis and conclusions set forth in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission, the Commissioners, or any Commis-
sion Bureau.
Coate presents a model of the merger settlement process that predicts one side will generally “win” 2
in settlement negotiations and obtain its goals.  Thus, when the government holds the more powerful
negotiating position, it will be able to obtain settlements sufficient to maintain regulatory power in
merger enforcement.
As noted later in the text, the 1992 Merger Guidelines advance a three part test of timeliness, likeli- 3
hood, and sufficiency for evaluating ease of entry.  While one could argue this simply restates the
rejected “quick and effective” standard, other interpretations are possible.  The detailed discussion in the
Guidelines allows for a broad interpretation of timeliness such that the definition could be customized
to the facts under study, instead of limited to some vague understanding of “quick.”  Likewise, the
concepts of likelihood and sufficiency, taken together, address the issue of “effective” entry.  However,
both concepts are developed in detail and implicitly allow for case-by-case customization of the analysis.
Thus, under the Guidelines structure, it may be possible to point to some type of barrier to entry.116
In Country Lake Foods, the court cited efficiencies as one of the reasons why the merger is unlikely 4
to lead to an anticompetitive effect.  Since the transaction made the acquiring firm a stronger competitor,
prices were likely to be competed down.
Promotions and coupons may be considered forms of price discrimination.  A firm may regularly 5
discount or coupon its product to capture sales from marginal customers, while at the same time selling
the product at full price to inframarginal customers the remainder of the time.  The higher the share of
the firm’s sales on special, the more important the marginal customers become in the analysis.  Promo-
tions and coupons can also be considered a type of introductory offer.  The firm heavily discounts its
product to induce consumers to try the product in the hopes of obtaining full price business.  One would
expect introductory offers to be infrequent and of limited duration, hence most of the product would trade
at full price.
For example, a new generic entry may not eliminate unilateral competitive concerns associated with 6
the loss of a branded competitor.
It is unlikely the Guidelines concern with scale is relevant, because the retailer does not face 7
significant sunk costs.
The Guidelines note sunk costs can be considered significant if they cannot be recovered by 8
charging a price five percent above the competitive level for one year.
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